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Abstract
This paper studies the macroeconomic implications of changes in the degree of access to
the credit market in an economy with credit frictions. I examine how the provision of credit in
connection with collateral assets a⁄ects economic performance and the business cycle.
In the framework of an economy in which credit constraints arise because borrowers cannot
force lenders to repay, I show that, as expected, facilitating collateralized debt ￿nancing implies
an increase in production e¢ ciency and welfare. Moreover, I also show how the rise in collat-
eral/asset prices is a direct consequence of credit market development. Last, I demonstrate
that the model can reproduce the non linear relation between LTV ratio and output volatility.
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11 Introduction
During the past two decades ￿nancial systems have experienced deep structural changes as a result
of regulatory reforms and technological innovations. Financial market reforms have taken place
both in developing and developed countries. Particularly among OECD countries, the United
States, the United Kingdom and the Nordic Countries implemented government reforms directed
to credit market deregulation.
The main goal was to improve e¢ ciency within the ￿nancial system, but the macroeconomic
implications could go beyond the main motivation. The deregulation process discouraged household
savings and contributed to a considerable increase in bank loans extended to the private sector1.
The ratio of private outstanding credit over total disposable income therefore reached very high
levels in the last years2. The high level of credit to the private sector and particularly household
indebtedness (see Figure 1), both in absolute terms and relative to their income, has attracted the
attention of policy makers and rised concerns about the macroeconomic implications.
Following the process of deregulation not only private sector￿ s borrowing increased but also asset
prices have raised rapidly. The increasing trend in housing and property prices has contributed to
the rise in the private debt3. Should the high levels of private sector indebtedness combined with
the increase in asset prices be a reason of worry for the stability of our economy?
The process of deregulation in the credit market took place in many di⁄erent ways. Various
measures have been implemented since the middle 80ths in order to increase competitiveness in the
credit market and make easier the access to credit ￿nancing. This paper investigates the role played
by the provision of credit in connection with collateral assets and its macroeconomic implications.
Thus, I restrict the attention to the e⁄ects of development in the credit market and particularly in
the banking technology of liquidating the collateral assets. A more developed banking liquidation
technology results in an improved access to the credit market, that turns out to have relevant
implications for the response of aggregate variables to shocks over the business cycle.
In some countries, regulations imposed low values for the maximum loan to value (LTV) ratio
in the mortgage markets. Di⁄erent studies suggest that LTV ratios have been raised over time in
most OECD countries. In Italy for instance, until the mid-80 a maximum loan to value ratio of 50%
was imposed by regulation. Following the process of deregulation it was increased to 75% in 1986
1See among others Gelosos and Werner (1999) for the case of Mexico, Leslie Hull (2003) for New Zealand, Boone,
Laurence, Nathalie Girouard and Isabelle Wanner (2001) and Claus, Iris and Grant Scobie (2001) for an international
comparison.
2Guy Debelle, Household Debt and the Macroeconomy, BIS Quartely Review, March 2004.
3Figure 2.a-2.b show the trend in real aggregate asset prices ￿a weighted mean of housing, property and equity
prices ￿over the last thirty years. These variables show an increasing common trend in most of the countries.
2and to 100% in 19954. Figure 2 shows the maximum and average LTV ratio in some countries for
the last years. LTV ratios range from 90% in the Netherlands to 55% in Italy. Table 1 reports the
current legal and regulatory limit on the LTV ratio in the EU mortgage markets.
In the model the loan to value ratio represents the level of development of the banking liquidation
technology and at the same time determines the degree of access to the credit market. Regardless of
whether private sector debt is sustainable, the large stock of borrowing could increase the sensitivity
of the private sector to ￿ uctuations in income, capital prices (housing, buildings, machinery) and the
interest rate. A greater level of indebtedness may reduce the ability to smooth temporary negative
shocks due to the burden of debt. In fact, during periods of stable economic conditions an easier
access to loans ￿for instance due to a relaxed ceiling on the loan to value ratio ￿could improve
economic performance. But, on the other hand, an excessive debt accumulation in preceding periods
might become burdening for the borrowers if market conditions reverse.
This paper is related to the large literature about ￿nancial frictions and business cycle. Most
of the theoretical research focuses on credit frictions as a transmission mechanism that propagates
and ampli￿es shocks. Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Calstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist (1999) among others, study the relevance of ￿nancial factors on ￿rm￿ s investment
decisions, emphasizing the role of agency-costs and limited enforceability. Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) and Kiyotaki (1998) show that if debt needs to be fully secured by collateral, small shocks
can have large and persistent e⁄ects on economic activity.
Kiyotaki and Moore￿ s work has been very in￿ uential and a big strand of the literature has
used collateral constraints as an ampli￿cation mechanism of shocks. However, in models with
collateral constraints little attention has been devoted to the impact of credit market development
on economic activity and the business cycle.
An exception is Aghion, Baccheta and Banerjee (2003) who study credit development as a source
of instability in a small open economy. They show that small open economies at an intermediate
level of ￿nancial development are more vulnerable to shocks. They assume that ￿rms can borrow
￿ times the amount of their current level of investible funds. Where ￿ represents the degree of
development of the ￿nancial sector.
Campbell and Hercowitz (2004) study how credit market development a⁄ects the volatility in
hours, output and household debt. Their model is based on the household sector and the interaction
between access to the credit market and labor supply is of great importance in showing that a lower
collateral requirement implies lower volatility.
Both Aghion, Baccheta and Banerjee (2003) and Campbell and Hercowitz (2004) use the co-
lateral requirment as a proxy for credit market development and compare macroeconomic volatility
4See Jappelli and Pagano 1998
3under few di⁄erent calibrations of the collateral requirement. On the contrary, i analyse the dy-
namic of the model over a wider range of degree of access to the credit market. In this way I￿ m
able to show that the relationship between credit market development and output volatility is non
linear.
More recently, Quadrini and Jerman (2005) show that ￿nancial development enables ￿rms to
take on more debt making the economy more vulnerable to shocks. But, at the same time it
improves the access to alternative sources of funding allowing for greater ￿ exibility in investments.
Thus, the business cycle results depend on which of the two mechanisms prevails.
Di⁄erently from some of the other models, my focus is on a closed economy model in which
both lenders and borrowers sectors are modelled. I use a collateral constraint based on real assets
and I thus give a primary role to the asset prices and I focus on credit friction at the ￿rms level
where the collateral is also an input of production. I investigate not only the e⁄ects of an aggregate
technology shock but also the consequences of a shock to the supply of loans. Most importantly I
focus on the impact of permanent shocks to the loan to value ratio.
The model is built on Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In order to generate a motive for the
existence of credit ￿ ows, two types of agents are assumed. Both of them produce and consume the
same good using a physical asset. They di⁄er in terms of discount factors and as a consequence
impatient agents are borrowers. Credit constraints arise because lenders cannot force borrowers to
repay. Thus, physical assets such as land, buildings and machinery, are used not only as factors of
production but also as collateral for loans.
The setup di⁄ers from Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) in that I use more standard assumptions
about preferences and technologies. First, in their paper the two groups of agents are risk neutral.
Moreover, they represent two di⁄erent sectors of the economy ￿borrowers are "farmers" and lenders
are "gatherers" ￿and thus, apart from using di⁄erent discount factors, they also di⁄er in their
production technology. In the present setup both groups of agents have a concave utility function
and are identical, except that they have di⁄erent subjective discount factors. The setup turns out
to be similar to the one used by Cordoba and Ripoll (2004). However, I also introduce aggregate
uncertainty in the model. Thus, di⁄erently from all the other speci￿cations of the model previously
adopted in the literature, asset prices are not perfectly foreseen by agents. Last, but most important
I also allow for the existence of liquidation costs in modelling the collateral constraint. Therefore, I
can investigate the macroeconomic consequences of structural changes implying an improved access
to credit ￿nancing.
I show that facilitating collateralized debt ￿nancing implies a rise in collateral/asset prices. In
fact, an increased access to the credit market implies a credit expansion and thus a rise in the level
of investment by borrowers. This leads to a more e¢ cient allocation of capital between the two
4groups and consequently increases e¢ ciency in production. As a result in the new steady state the
level of output, and thus total consumption, would be higher.
Moreover, at an intermediate level of LTV ratio the impact of shocks over the business cycle is
stronger. In fact, the model can reproduce the non linear relation between LTV ratio and output
volatility.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylised facts, Section 3 presents the
model and Section 4 the solution, Section 5 analyses the relation between improvement in credit
market technology and business cycle, Section 6 draws some tentative conclusions.
2 Some Stylized Facts
Is the degree of access to the credit market related to the size of business cycle ￿ uctuations? In
the literature there is no rigorous evidence on the relation between credit market development and
output volatility. Campbell and Hercowitz (2004) show that in the US, ￿nancial reforms of the
early 1980￿ s coincided with a decline in volatility of output, consumption and hours worked. Thus,
in their paper, lower collateral requirements explain higher macroeconomic stability
The decline in output volatility in the last 20 years is a well-known fact. Changes in the
underlying characteristics of the economy and thus in the mechanism through which exogenous
shocks spread through and propagate in the economy could be the main reason for such a decline.
Several studies give a primary role to the conduct of monetary policy [see e.g. Clarida, Gali and
Gertler(2000), Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2003), Boivin and Giannoni (2002), Canova()]. Other
studies, show that the decrease in in￿ ation and output volatility is given by changes in the variance
of exogenous shocks [Sims(2001, Sims and Zha(2001)]. A few studies claim that instead it depends
on other characteristics of the economy [Hanson (2001), Campbell and Hercowitz (2004)].
Is credit market development one of the main reason for the increase in macroeconomic stabil-
ity? What is the relation between business cycles and credit market development in industrialized
countries?
This section presents some stylized facts. The evidence is based on quarterly data for OECD
countries over the last ten years. Data on the LTV ratio represent the normal maximum loan to
value ratio5 . To approximate output volatility I use real GDP (OECD sources).
Figure 3 shows the cross-country correlations between business cycles and LTV ratios. The
cyclical component of the time series in real terms is calculated implementing the Hodrik and
Prescott (1997) ￿lter. Standard deviations of the cyclical components measure the volatility of the
series over the time period considered.
5Source: Oecd. The European Mortgage Federation also reports the absolute maximum loan to value ratio.
5Figure 3 indicates that business cycles are more pronounced at an intermediate level of LTV
ratio. Cross country, at an intermediate degree of access to the credit market output volatility
is higher. At a ￿rst glace there is no evidence of a positive linear relation between credit market
development and macroeconomic stability. On the contray, the relation shown is clearly non-linear.
3 The Model
3.1 Economic Environment
Consider a stochastic discrete time economy populated by two types of households that trade two
kinds of goods: a durable asset and a non durable commodity. The durable asset (k) does not
depreciate and has a ￿xed supply normalized to one. The commodity good (c) is produced with
the durable asset and cannot be stored.
At time t there are two competitive markets in the economy: the asset market in which the one
unit of durable asset can be exchanged for qt units of consumption good, and the credit market.
I assume a continuum of ex-ante heterogeneous households of unit mass: n1 Patient Households
(denoted by 1) and n2 Impatient Households (denoted by 2). In order to impose the existence of
￿ ows of credit in this economy I assume ex-ante heterogeneity based on di⁄erent subjective discount
factor.
Assumption 1 : ￿2 < ￿1 < 1
This assumption ensures that in equilibrium patient households lend and impatient households
borrow.
Both agents produce the commodity good using the same technology
yit = Ztk￿
it￿1
where Zt represent an aggregate technology shock. It follows an AR(1) process
ln(Zt) = ￿Z ln(Zt￿1) + "Zt; "Zt viid N(0;￿"Z);0 < ￿Z < 1
Assumption 2 : ￿1 = ￿2 < 1
Di⁄erently from Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) I assume that agents have access to the same
concave production technology6. In fact, in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) the two groups of agents
also represent two di⁄erent sectors of the economy. However, I still follow Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) in assuming that the technology is speci￿c to each producer and only the household that
started the production has the skills necessary to conclude the production. This means that if
6See Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) for a discussion on how di⁄erent assumptions about the production technology
a⁄ect the impact of technology shocks in this economy.
6household i decides to not put his e⁄ort in the production between t and t+1 there would be
no outcome of production at t+1, and there would only be the asset kit at t+1. The household
cannot precommit to produce. Moreover, he is free to walk away from the production and the debt
contracts between t and t+1. This results in a default problem that makes creditors to protect
themselves by collateralizing the household￿ s asset. The creditor knows that in case the household
runs away from production and debt obligations, they will get his asset. The debt repayment, bit+1,
of the borrower is limited to a fraction of next period expected value of the asset:
bit ￿ ￿Et [qt+1kit]
Assumption 3: ￿ < 1
Unlike the rest of the literature, I allow for the existence of liquidation costs in modelling the
collateral constraint. Limiting the borrowing to a fraction of the expected liquidation value of the
capital takes into account di⁄erent degrees of development of the credit market technology. A high
￿ represents a developed ￿nancial sector while a low ￿ characterizes an underdeveloped system.
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bit ￿ ￿Et [qt+1kit]
Where kit is a durable asset, cit a consumption good, and bit the debt level. ￿it is a preference
shock that hits only patient households following an AR(1) process:
ln(￿1t) = ￿Z ln(￿1t￿1) + "￿t; "￿t viid N(0;￿"￿);0 < ￿￿ < 1












where Fki;t = ￿Ztk
￿￿1
it￿1 is the marginal product of capital.
7The ￿rst equation relates the marginal bene￿t of borrowing to its marginal cost. For constrained
agents the marginal bene￿t is always bigger than the marginal cost of borrowing. If I de￿ne ￿i;t ￿ 0
as the multiplier associated with the borrowing constraint the euler equation becomes:
Uci;t
Rt
￿ ￿i;t = ￿iEtUci;t+1








is bigger or equal to the expected discounted marginal product of capital. For constrained agents
the marginal bene￿t of holding one unit of capital is given not only by its marginal product but










In a neighborhood of the steady state, Impatient Households borrow up to the maximum. Conse-
quently, they face an always binding borrowing constraint. Thus
b2;t = ￿Et [qt+1k2t]
and
k2t =












, represents the di⁄erence between the price of capital and the amount he can
borrow against a unit of capital, i.e. the downpayment required to buy a unit of capital. Patient
households are creditors in a neighborhood of the steady state. The creditor￿ s capital decision










4.1 Deterministic Steady State
The e¢ cient allocation of capital between the two groups would be given by the equality between
the marginal products of the two groups:
Fk1;t = Fk2;t
7That is his output and the value of the land held the perious period net of debt repayment.
8Thus, given the aggregate condition on capital
n1k1 + n2k2 = K1 + K2 = 1
then, since the total population is normalized to be equal to the unit interval
K
eff
2 = n2 and K
eff
1 = 1 ￿ n2
This means that if the two groups are equally large, each group gets the same amount of capital in
steady state8. See Figure 4.a.
In the steady state of the present model, the group of impatient households is credit constrained.
Consider the euler equation of the impatient household
uc2;t
Rt
￿ ￿2;t = ￿2Etuc2;t+1















uc2 = (￿1 ￿ ￿2)uc2
As long as Assumption 1 holds, the lagrange multiplier associated with borrowing constraint
for the impatient household is strictly positive. Thus, impatient households are credit constrained




1 :Using the equations repre-
senting the households￿optimal choice of capital evaluated at the steady state it is possible to show




￿1 [1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿(￿1 ￿ ￿2)]
(1 ￿ ￿1)￿2
> 1





: In fact the equation above is always bigger than 1 as long as ￿ < 1
￿1:
And due to Assumption 3 this is always the case. The steady state allocation of capital depends
8If n1 = n2 = 0:5 then K
eff
2 = 0:5 and K
eff
1 = 0:5








9on the subjective discount factors, the fraction of the two groups of agents and the degree of credit












Compared to the ￿rst best allocation, the allocation under credit constraints reduces the level of
capital held by the borrowers. Moreover, it implies a di⁄erence in the marginal productivity of the
two groups so long as ￿ < 1
￿1 = 1:0101: See Figure 4.b..
In steady state the asset prices depend on the marginal productivity of capital. More speci￿cally,






1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿(￿1 ￿ ￿2)
Fk2
4.2 Dynamics
The agents￿optimal choices of bonds and capital together with the aggregate conditions on capital
and bonds and total production and one budget constraint (see appendix 1.1),i.e. equilibrium
conditions, represent a non-linear dynamic stochastic system of equations. Since the equations
represent well behaved functions, it is possible to adopt standard local approximation techniques
to ￿nd the solution. All the methods commonly used for this kind of systems rely on log-linear
approximations around the steady state to get a solvable stochastic system of di⁄erence equations.
By ￿nding a solution I mean to write all variables as linear functions of a vector of state
variables, both endogenous state xt￿1 and exogenous state ztvariables, i.e. I are looking for the
recursive equilibrium law of motion:
xt = Pxt￿1 + Qzt
yt = Rxt￿1 + Szt
where yt is the vector of endogenous (or jump) variables.
In order to solve for the recursive law of motion I need to ￿nd the matrices P;Q;R;S so that the
equilibrium described by these rules is stable. I solve this system via the method of undetermined
coe¢ cients (McCallum (1983), King, Plosser and Rebelo (1987), Campbell (1994), Uhlig (1995)
among others)10.
10See Harald Uhlig "A Toolkit for Analyzing Nonlinear Dynamic Stochastic Models Easily" for the description of
the solution method.
104.3 Calibration
I calibrate the model at quarterly frequencies. I set patient households￿discount factor equal to
0.99, such that the average annual rate of return is about 4%. I calibrate impatient households￿
discount factors according to Lawrance (1991) and Samwick (1998) that estimate discount factors,
respectively, for poor and young households in the range (0.97, 0.98). The share of capital in the
production ￿ is 0.36 as in the tradition of the real business cycle literature11. The baseline choice for
the fraction of borrowing constrained population is set to 50%.Following the literature on collateral
constraint, technology shocks are assumed to have zero persistence. I also assume no persistence in
the preference shock while the Loan to Value Ratio shock is assumed to be permanent. I calibrate
the technology shocks according to standard values in the real business cycle literature12. Tab. 1
summarizes the calibrated parameters.
Basic Calibration
preferences shock process
discount rate ￿1 = 0:99 autocorrelation
￿2 = 0:97 ￿z = 0
technology ￿G = 0
capital share ￿ = 0:36 ￿￿ = 0
￿￿ = 1
population n = 0:5
Tab. 1
5 Credit Market Development and Business Cycle
5.1 A Look to the Steady State
Limiting borrowing to a fraction of the expected liquidation value of the capital takes into account
di⁄erent degrees of development of the banking technology in liquidating the collateral. High ￿
represents a developed credit sector while a low ￿ characterizes an underdeveloped system. Note
that (1-￿ ) is the cost of liquidation. Thus, as in Aghion, Baccheta and Banerjee (2003), the way
credit market development is modelled is through relaxing credit restrictions. The parameter ￿,
representing the loan to value ratio, a⁄ects the steady state allocation of capital, the determination
of the level of borrowing and the asset price. A permanent increase in ￿ rises the level of capital
held in the new steady state by borrowers. In fact, the derivative of K2 with respect to ￿ is strictly
positive. Moreover, a permanent increase in ￿ raises the steady state asset price level. As long as
11See Cooley and Prescott (1995) or Prescott (1986).
12For the technology shock see, Cooley & Prescott (1995, chapter 1 in Cooley￿ s book), or Prescott 1986.
11￿ < 1 the marginal productivity for lenders is increasing in K2: Thus, in the new steady state asset
price is settled to a higher level.
Figure 4.b shows how ￿ a⁄ects the marginal productivity and thus e¢ ciency in production.
Ceteris paribus a higher ￿ reduces the di⁄erence between borrowers￿and lenders￿marginal produc-
tivity. Even if it is not possible to reach the e¢ cient equilibrium (Fk1;t = Fk2;t) it is possible to
reduce the e¢ ciency loss by setting ￿ closer to 1.
Changes in steady state values due to credit market development are shown in Figure 4. An
increased access to the credit market implies a credit expansion and thus a rise in the level of
investment by borrowers. As expected this leads to a more e¢ cient allocation of capital between
the two groups and consequently to an increase in production. As a result in the new steady state
the level of output, and thus total consumption, is higher. The price of the collateral/asset is also
higher.
Up to a certain value of ￿, borrowers￿consumption also increases. This could be due to both a
credit channel e⁄ect and a wealth e⁄ect. Agents bene￿t of both a larger access to debt ￿nancing
and an increasing value of their assets.
As expected for high values of ￿ borrowers￿steady state consumption decreases to reach very
low values as ￿ approaches 1. In an environment with relaxed credit restrictions impatient agents
prefer to consume more today than in the future reducing in this way the steady state level of
consumption.
Easing the liquidity constraints faced by households leads to a rise not only in the household
indebtedness level but also in the ratio of household liabilities to production. Indebtedness increases
more than production. Moreover, borrowers￿wealth decreases while total wealth increases.
5.2 Degree of Credit Financing and Technology Shocks
I now consider the response of the model economy to a negative technology shock. In order to
analyze the role of credit market development as a source of instability over the business cycle I
compare the responses of economies with di⁄erent degrees of access to the credit market.
I assume that the economy is at the steady state level at time zero and then is hit by an
unexpected one-time (￿ = 0) increase in aggregate productivity of 1%.
The results are reported in Figures 8-9. The units on the vertical axes are percentage deviations
from the steady state, while on the horizontal axes are years.
An aggregate positive technology shock a⁄ects positively production and thus the earnings of
both groups of agents. Since the shock is temporary agents save part of the extra resources to
smooth consumption. Constrained agents smooth the e⁄ects of the shock by buying more capital.
The rise in current investment expenditures propagates the e⁄ect on borrowers￿production over
12time. Since the marginal productivity of capital is higher for borrowers, there is a persistent e⁄ect
on agregate production as well.
In order for the capital market to clear, lenders have to reduce their demand for capital and
thus the user cost of holding capital has to increase. The collateral price dynamics equation shows
that this price is directly a⁄ected by marginal productivity of the collateral asset. The collateral
price is directly a⁄ected by the technology shock through the marginal productivity but also by the
asset dynamics.
Fk1;t+j+1 = ^ zt+j+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)^ k1t+j
The rise in asset prices, coupled with the increase in investments and a reduction in interest rate
implies a credit boom
^ bt+1 = ^ qt+1 + ^ kt+1 ￿ ^ Rt
Thus, constrained agents su⁄er the direct impact of the technology shock and also the indirect
impact through asset prices and interest rate variations.




A positive technology shock implies an increase in current consumption expenditure but raises
expectations of a future decrease. Thus, the interest rate goes down. The dynamic of the interest
rate could change according to di⁄erent calibrations of the parameters of the utility function.
Now, I study how the impact of the technology shock is a⁄ected by di⁄erent degrees of credit
market development. Figure 10 shows how the ￿rst impact of a technology shock on individual
consumption is related to the degree of access to the credit market. The higher ￿ the stronger the
reaction of consumption. When the degree of access to credit ￿nancing is higher agents enter the
period with an higher level of indebtedness. Consequently they are more heavily leveraged and thus
when a shock occurs less able to smooth its e⁄ects. As shown in Figure 5, the higher ￿ the lower
the beginning of the period wealth of constrained agents. In fact, even if the value of their assets
and their fraction of total output is higher, the burden of the debt decreases their initial wealth.
Higher leveraged agents are less able to smooth the e⁄ects of shocks on consumption.
Figure 11 shows instead the intensity of the reaction of investment decisions by constrained
agents. The impact of the shock on capital expenditure shows an inverted U relationship with
the degree of access to the credit market. On the same graph is ploted the e⁄ect of the shock on
the downpayment. The di⁄erence between the price of capital and the amount agents can borrow
against a unit of capital represent the amount required to buy a unit of capital. As we see, the
13reactions of investment decisions and downpayment are symmetricaly opposite. The stronger the
e⁄ect on downpayment, the weaker the reaction of capital. The shape of the relationship between
the degree of access to credit market and the e⁄ect on downpayment can be explained by the
existence of two opposite forces determining the intensity of downpayment reaction. In fact the







When a technology shock takes place, the price of capital and the interest rate move in the
opposite direction. For instance, a negative technology shock has a negative e⁄ect on qt and a
positive impact on Rt. Moreover, as shown in Figure 11 the higher ￿ the weaker the reaction of
qt to the shock. In economies with higher access to the credit market qt reduces by less, then also
the downpayment required reduces by less. Being more expensive to buy capital, we expect k2t
to reduce by more. On the contrary, an higher ￿ is associated to a weaker reaction of the interest
rate to shocks. When Rt increases by less, the increase in the downpayment is reduced, thus, the
reaction of k2t is expected to be weaker. Thus, the intensity of capital response depends on which
of the two opposite e⁄ect prevales. Figure 12.b shows how the reaction of capital varies with ￿
when the interest rate is constant over the business cycle. Since now the e⁄ect on downpayment is
weaker the higher ￿ (it only depends on qt), the impact of the shock on capital is larger.
How does a technology shock a⁄ect total productivity under di⁄erent credit market regimes?
As already pointed out by Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), the elasticity of total output to technology
shocks can be written as13:







The ￿rst term is the productivity gap between constrained and unconstrained agents, ￿ represent
the share of collateral in production while
y2
y is the production share of constrained agents and ￿k2z
is the redistribution of capital. As shown in steady state Figures (5) the fraction of total output
produced by constrained agents increases with ￿ due to the fact that more capital is held by the
constrained population. However, for the same reason, the productivity gap decreases with ￿. Thus,
the second impact on depends on this two opposite forces. Figure 12 shows how the reaction of
total output to a technology shock varies with the degree of access to credit ￿nancing. The second
Figure represents the case of constant interest rate. As we see, regardless the shape of capital
reaction to technology shocks, the relationship between ￿ and the second impact of zt on yt has an
inverted U shape. That is of course more pronounced when ￿k2z is not monotonic.
13Since the ￿rst impact of the shock would always be equal to the shock itself, we now look at the second period
e⁄ect of the shock.
14Now, I look at the volatility of output and asset prices delivered by the symulated model. Figure
13 shows the standard deviation of this two variable in economies with di⁄erent degrees of access
to the credit market. Each point represents the asymptotic standard deviation of output or asset
prices given a particular value for ￿ in the range [0,1]. The relation between output volatility and
￿ shows an inverted U shape. Thus, according to the model, both the ￿rst impact and standard
deviation have the same kind of non-linear relationship with the degree of access to the credit
market. Asset prices volatility declines with ￿ up to 0.9 to rise intead for higher values of ￿:
6 Conclusion
[preliminary]
This paper studies how the provision of credit in connection with collateral assets a⁄ects both
economic performance and the business cycle volatility. I provide a simple framework for analyzing
the role of credit market development in an economy with imperfect credit markets.
I assume that agents face credit constraints, with the constraints being tighter at a lower level
of credit market development. This model economy is used to discuss the interaction between
aggregate output dynamics, collateral/asset prices and wealth distribution.
I show that an increased access to the credit market implies higher asset prices. Being able to
borrow more, the impatient agents increase both their consumption and investment expenditures.
This leads to a more e¢ cient allocation of capital between the two groups of agents and consequently
increases total production and wealth. For the market to clear the other group of agents should be
willing to demand less of the asset in ￿x supply. Thus, their opportunity cost of holding the asset
must increase.
A second contribution of this paper is to analyze the link between credit market development
and business cycles. The higher level of liabilities, both in absolute terms and relative to the income,
make agents less able to smooth the e⁄ects of technology shocks. Economies at an intermediate
level of credit market development are more vulnerable to shocks.
Policies directed to credit market development should take into account the impact on business
cycle volatility. Based on the ￿rst results, policy makers should promote credit market development
as a source of improvement in economic performance and welfare. On the other hand, regardless of
credit sustainability and ￿nancial crises, they should also pay attention to the impact of the credit
market characteristic on short-run instability.
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18Appendix .1 Equilibrium Conditions

























n1k1t + n2k2t = K1t + K2t = 1 (E.5)
yt = n1y1t + n2y2t (E.6)
n1b1t + n2b2t = 0 (E.7)
1 budget constraint14





b2;t = ￿Et [qt+1k2t] (E.9)
the resource constraint
yt = n1c1t + n2c2t (E.10)
the two technologies:
y1t = Ztk￿
1t￿1 y2t = Ztk￿
2t￿1 (E.11)
12 equations and 12 unknowns:f￿2t;qt;Rt;ytg and fcit;kit;bit;yitg
1
t=0 for i=1,2.
14Using the Walras￿Law we can drop at each t one of the two budget constraints.
19Appendix .2 Steady State




from E.2 the lagrange multiplier:
￿2 = (￿1 ￿ ￿2)uc2 (ss.2)






1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿(￿1 ￿ ￿2)
Fk2 (ss.3)
and substituting for K1 using the aggregate condition on capital: K1 = 1￿K2 I ￿nd the steady


























In case the two group of agents have di⁄erent technologies, substituting for K1 the equation
become nonlinear in K2 and not solvable analytically,thus, a nonlinear root￿nding problem arises.
In the nonlinear root￿nding problem, a function f mapping Rn to Rn is given and one must
compute an n-vector x, called a root of f, that satis￿es f(x) = 0. In our problem the f(x) is
represented by ss.












Thus I ￿nd the steady state borrowing level:
b2 = ￿ [qk2] = ￿b1 (ss.5)
and the total production:
y = n1y1 + n2y2 (ss.6)
where
y1 = k￿
1 y2 = k￿
2 (ss.7)
20From E.8 I ￿nd the consumption of the borrowers







and from the resource constraint the consumption of the group of lenders
n1c1 = y ￿ n2c2 (ss.9)
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